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Science and Human Well-Being 
Toward a New Way of 
Structuring Scientific Activity 
Hugh Lacey 
INTRODUCTION 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos begins A Discourse on the Sciences by posing 
Rousseau's question: "Is there a relationship between science and virtue?" 
(Santos 1992, 10). He elaborates: "we must ask about the contribution of 
all the accumulated scientific knowledge to enriching or impoverishing our 
lives. In other words, we must ask if science has contributed positively or 
negatively to our happiness" (Santos 1992, 11-12). 
In this chapter, I address the related question: "How should science be 
pursued in order to enhance human well-being?" Variations of this ques-
tion have been suggested recently by philosophers of science. Here are two 
of them: 
the most important topic in the philosophy of science [is] the relation of sci-
ence to human values. What contributions can or should science make to hu-
man well-being? ... If there is one conclusion of overriding importance to be 
drawn from the increasing realization in recent times that science is a human 
product, it is that, like other human products, the only way it can ultimately be 
evaluated is in terms of whether it contributes to the thriving of sentient beings 
in the universe. (Dupre 1993, 244, 264) 
Reflective people ... want to know whether research in various areas is skewed 
by the values of particular groups and, at the broadest level, how science bears 
on human flourishing .... It has been obvious for about half a century that re-
search yielding epistemic benefits may have damaging consequences for the in-
dividual or even the whole species. Philosophical stories about science have 
been narrowly focused on the epistemic. Faced with lines of research that have 
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the capacity to alter the environment in radical ways, to transform our self-un-
derstanding, and to interact with a variety of social institutions and social prej-
udices to affect human lives, there is a much larger problem of understanding 
just how the sciences bear on human flourishing. (Kitcher 1998, 46) 1 
Elsewhere (Lacey 2004a, xi), with these quotations in mind, I have affirmed 
that there are rich dialectical interactions among the questions: "How to 
conduct scientific research?" "How to structure society?" and "How to fur-
ther human well-being?" Science must be appraised for the cognitive ( epis-
temic) value of its theoretical products and-when positively appraised 
cognitively-it can (and should) also be appraised for its contribution to 
social justice and human well-being. In this chapter I briefly explain why 
this is so. 
SCIENCE AS VALUE FREE 
Throughout its 400-year history, there has been a strong tradition of the in-
terpretation of modern science that maintains that the question, "How 
should science be pursued in order to enhance human well-being?" is in-
appropriate; even posing it ( or Rousseau's question) displays misunder-
standing of the nature of science and threatens its integrity. 
Impartiality, Autonomy, Neutrality 
According to this interpretation, there is no role for values2 at the core of 
science: they should not be among the criteria for making scientific judg-
ments, and they have no fundamental role in the practices of gaining and 
appraising scientific understanding: the broad characteristics of scientific 
methodology should be responsive only to the interest of gaining deepened 
understanding of phenomena of the world, and the priorities and direction 
of research should not be shaped systematically by particular values. I call 
these two views, respectively, "impartiality of scientific judgment" and "au-
tonomy of methodology."3 They are held as ideals, values of scientific prac-
tices, sometimes not well manifested in actual fact. 
Usually they are held together with neutrality, that science gives privilege 
no particular social values-that scientific theories should exhibit cognitive 
neutrality: social value judgments are not among their logical implications; 
and applied neutrality: on application, in principle they can inform even-
handedly interests of a wide range of values. To a first approximation, these 
three views together sum up what is meant by "science is value-free."4 The in-
tegrity, legitimation, prestige and alleged universal value of science have of-
ten been tied to science is value free being highly manifested in the practices 
of science for, it tends to be taken for granted, it is science conducted in 
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such practices that has produced the technological applications that have so 
transformed the world in recent times. 
Three Moments of Scientific Activity 
We may distinguish three moments (logically, not necessarily temporally 
distinct), or decision-making points, of scientific activity (Lacey 20046 ): 
M
1
, where priorities and direction for research and appropriate method-
ologies are determined; M2, where theories (hypotheses) are appraised; and 
M1' where scientific knowledge is applied. On the traditional interpretation, 
M; and M
2 
are the core of science. M
3 
follows them and presupposes posi-
tive appraisal at M2 of the theories to be applied. At M1 values have not only 




there is no 
proper ( or, at least, indispensable) role for them. As Baptista (2002, 96)-
an exemplary proponent of the view of science being sketched in this 
section-wrote in criticising Santos (1992): "How could scientific knowl-
edge have any moral coloring?" Even at Mv according to applied neutrality, 
science does not serve any particular valuesi as Baptista (2002, 96) observes: 
"The results of science are ethically and morally neutral." Scientific knowl-
edge is available, in principle, to inform projects of interest to any values at 
all; it may be used for good or evil, but when it is used for evil that reflects 
not on scientific knowledge but on those who applied it. What happens at 
the core of science cannot be held responsible for abusive uses to which sci-
entific knowledge may be put. Nevertheless, those who share the traditional 
interpretation insist that scientific knowledge has normally been, and will 
continue to be, used for a great variety of good ends, because it has been the 
source of so many "new possibilities and potentialities ... that have pro-
foundly changed the conditions and even the quality of life of a large part 
of humanities" (Baptista 2002, 83, 95; my translation) . It is a small step 
from these assertions to the claim that science itself should be considered a 
universal value. 
I recognize the attraction of this interpretation of science and I do not 
think that it is wholly mistaken. In order to get at its limitations and, at the 
same time, to begin to explain why it has dominated the tradition of mod-
ern science, I will offer an alternative picture of scientific activity. 5 
SCIENTIFIC ACTIVITY 
Scientific Understanding 
The objective of science may be put as follows: To gain, in systematic ways, 
soundly (rationally) empirically grounded understanding of phenomena 
and things (and of an increasing number and variety of them), where 
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understanding includes accounts of what the phenomena (things) are, of 
why that are the way they are, of the possibilities (including hitherto unactu-
alized ones) that they allow in virtue of their own underlying powers and 
the interactions into which they may enter, and of how to attempt to actu-
alize these possibilities (Lacey 1999a, ch. 5).6 
Scientific understanding is articulated in theories, each of which offers un-
derstanding of a specified domain of phenomena, where the soundness of 
the understanding articulated should be appraised in the light of available 
empirical data, of whether the available data suffices for making reliable 
cognitive judgments, and of cognitive criteria such as empirical adequacy 
and explanatory power that are rational symptoms of having gained under-
standing and that do not depend on any value judgments (Lacey 2004a, ch. 
3). When appraisals are soundly made solely in accordance with these con-
siderations, I say that a theory (hypothesis) has been accepted in accor-
dance with impartiality. The objective of science, then, might be restated as: 
To generate and consolidate theories, accepted in accordance with impar-
tiality, that progressively provide understanding of more and larger do-
mains of phenomena and possibilities. 
Impartiality is built into the quest for scientific understanding. Neutrality 
is not-neither cognitive nor applied neutrality ( section 1.1 ). Impartiality does 
not imply neutrality (Lacey 2002a; 2004a, chs. 4, 10). When a theory is ac-
cepted in accordance with impartiality, its acceptance contributes towards 
furthering the objective of science, but that does not mean tha\ h makes a 
significant contribution. Reference to the objective ( as stated above) does 
not provide direction to research, define what counts as worthwhile or sig-
nificant research (Kitcher 2001 ), or provide concrete answers to: What ques-
tions to pose, what puzzles to resolve, what classes of possibilities to at-
tempt to identify, what kinds of explanations to explore, what categories to 
deploy both in theories (hypotheses) and observational reports, what phe-
nomena to observe, measure and experiment upon, who are the appropri-
ate participants in research activity, what are their required qualifications, 
life backgrounds and virtues? 
Strategy: Constraints on Theories, Criteria for 
Selection of Data; What Possibilities to Investigate 
None of questions, just posed, can be addressed without the adoption of 
what I call a strategy (Lacey 2002a; 2004a, ch. 5). The principal roles of a 
strategy are to constrain the kinds of theories (hypotheses) that may be en-
tertained in a given domain of inquiry (so as to enable investigation) and 
the categories that they may deploy-and thus to specify the kinds of possibil-
ities that may be explored in the course of the inquiry-and to select the relevant 
kinds of empirical data to procure and the appropriate descriptive cate-
gories to use for making observational reports.7 
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Different classes of possibilities may require different strategies for their 
investigation. To borrow an example that I have used elsewhere (Lacey 2000; 
2002c; 2003a; 2003b ), the possibilities of seeds qua components of sustain-
able agroecosystems are not identical to their possibilities qua objects of ge-
netic engineering; both cannot be investigated under the same strategies and 
both cannot be coactualized in the same agricultural spaces. A multiplicity 
of competing strategies is required, if research is not to be limited in com-
pass to a narrow ( albeit potentially large) class of possibilities. 
The scientific knowledge that informs genetic engineering is a product of 
research conducted under a version (biotechnological) of what I call mate-
rialist strategies (Lacey 2002a; 2004a, ch. 6; 2004b ). Strategies of this kind 
are adopted almost exclusively in modern science. Under them theories are 
constrained so that they represent phenomena and encapsulate possibilities 
in terms of their being generable from underlying structure, process, interaction 
and law, dissociating them from any place they may have in relation to so-
cial arrangements, human lives and experience, from any link with value, 
and from whatever social, human and ecological possibilities that may also 
be open to them. Reciprocally, empirical data are selected, not only to meet 
the condition of intersubjectivity, but also so that their descriptive cate-
gories are generally quantitative, applicable in virtue of measurement, in-
strumental and experimental operations. Under materialist strategies, in-
tentional and value-laden categories are deliberately excluded from use in 
the formulation of theories, hypotheses and data, so that where they are de-
ployed there cannot be any value judgments among the formal entailments 
of theories and hypotheses. Adopting them thus suffices to ensure cognitive 
neutrality. This is a feature of their design. 
Adopting materialist strategies does not suffice, however, to ensure applied 
neutrality (Lacey 2001; 2004a, ch. 8-10; see quotes from Dupre and Kitcher 
at the outset.) . The example about seeds provides a useful illustration. 
When the biotechnological version of materialist strategies is adopted, the 
possibilities for the transformation of seeds by techniques of genetic engi-
neering can be identified; but their possibilities, when selected for use in 
productive, sustainable agroecosystems in which biodiversity is protected 
and community empowerment is furthered, cannot be, for these latter pos-
sibilities are not dissociated from social and experiential context. They can, 
however, be identified by research conducted under agroecological strategies 
(Lacey 2001; 2003a; 2003b ). 8 
Mutually Reinforcing Relations between 
Adopting a Strategy and Holding Values 
Why, then, in the institutions of modern science do materialist strategies 
tend to be adopted virtually exclusively so that, for example, research under 
biotechnological strategies is strongly supported and that under agroecological 
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strategies downplayed? Why, in these institutions, is it so difficult for re-
search, other than that conducted under versions of materialist strategies, 
even to be recognized as science? Why is the interpretation of science de-
scribed in section 1 so dominant in these institutions that normally only 
choice among versions of materialist strategies is recognized as belonging 
to the methodological component of M
1
? The reasons cannot always be 
purely cognitive (epistemic), for the interest of gaining understanding 
(knowledge) by itself does not account for one kind of possibilities of seeds 
( either their possibilities qua dissociated from social and other contexts, or 
those qua ecological and/or social objects) being considered more signifi-
cant than another. 
Not only has adopting materialist strategies enabled research that has 
been extraordinarily fruitful, but also it underlies great adaptability, usher-
ing in new varieties of materialist strategies as research has unfolded-so 
that, at various historical moments, when opportune we find strategies that 
deploy (e.g.) mechanical categories, mathematically formulated laws of var-
ious types ( deterministic and probabilistic, compatible or not with physi-
calistic reductionism), use of the mathematics of complexity and computer 
modelling (see section 2.5). The fruitfulness and resourcefulness of materi-
alist strategies are undoubtedly impressive and rightly establish a central 
position for them in scientific institutions. But, by itsel£ this does not war-
rant exclusivity. What else is involved? 
Elsewhere (Lacey 2002a; 20046, ch. 6) I have argued in detai1 that mutu-
ally reinforcing relationships between adopting materialist strategies and 
holding specifically modern values concerning the control of natural objects 
are cnicial.9 To give a summary statement, these values concern the scope of 
control, its centrality in daily life, and that relatively they are not subordi-
nated to other moral and social values-so that, for example, the expansion 
of technologies into more and more spheres of life and into becoming the 
means for solving more and more problems is especially highly valued, to 
such an extent that the kind of ecological and social disruption caused by 
this can be seen simply as the price of progress.10 It is acceptance of these 
specifically modern values about control of natural objects, and their wide-
spread manifestation in actual hegemonic institutions, not cognitive factors 
alone, that account, for example, for the general perception that research 
conducted under biotechnological strategies is more significant than that 
conducted under agroecological ones (Lacey 2000; 2001 ). In line with this, 
I have maintained that materialist strategies are adopted virtually exclu-
sively in the institutions of modern science in important part because, on ap-
plication, knowledge gained under them serves interests strongly linked 
with these values about control. These interests conflict with those of the 
emancipatory movements (like those that have been meeting at the World 
Social Forum), among whom it is common to value highly (among other 
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things) agroecological practices that aim simultaneously to further produc-
tivity, sustainability, preservation of biodiversity and social empowerment of 
poor communities (Lacey 20026; 20036; Santos 2002). Knowledge gained 
under materialist strategies serves these latter interests to a much lesser de-
gree (for, by definition, these strategies have nothing to contribute directly to 
identifying possibilities that are not defined in dissociation from human and 
social contexts); and, in some cases, it contributes to undermine them. 
On application, research conducted under materialist strategies (not in 
each and every instance, but on the whole when pursued virtually exclu-
sively) especially favors interests linked with the modern values about con-
trol (Lacey 2004a, ch. 10). Moreover, I have argued in neo-Baconian vein 
(Lacey 2004a, ch. 6), that is why materialist strategies are virtually exclu-
sively adopted: the deep embodiment of the values about control in mod-
ern hegemonic institutions-where they are reinforced, on the one hand, 
by the values of capital and the market and, on the other hand, by those of 
the military-explains this exclusivity, and the most compelling argument for 
the exclusivity draws upon (in conjunction with the fruitfulness and re-
sourcefulness of materialist strategies) mutually reinforcing relations that 
exist between adopting materialist strategies and holding the values about 
control. 11 
It is the deep grip of these values about control on modern sensibilities 
that renders the interpretation of science ( summarized in section 1) 
intelligible-and for many irresistible. These values pervade that interpreta-
tion so thoroughly, and it tends to be taken for granted that they represent 
universal values, that their role becomes invisible to the proponents of the 
interpretation. Then, indeed, there is no question of choosing between 
some version of materialist strategies and other strategies. The method-
ological strictures of materialist strategies become casually identified with 
those of science per se ( "the only explanation of reality," Baptista 2002, 94). 
Then, applicability that is neutral among projects valued partly because they em-
body the values about control (whether the projects be those of capital, the 
military or those of medicine-see Santos (1989, 149), but that otherwise 
are valued differently depending on different personal and institutional val-
ues, is misidentified with applied neutrality in general. 
Where the specifically modern values about control are held, there is 
heightened interest in the possibilities of things qua dissociated from their 
social and human context, that is, the possibilities that become actualized 
in modern technologies ( e.g., genetic engineering); so much so that, when 
materialist strategies are adopted virtually exclusively, few barriers are posed 
to inferring ceteris paribus from the confirmation of a theory that identifies 
a particular technological possibility to the legitimacy of the social actual-
ization of the possibility (Lacey 20046 ). The inference, of course, is medi-
ated by positive value judgments about control; and these, I have argued, 
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are effectively invisible where the interpretation of section 1 is dominant. 
Then, scientific resources cannot easily be brought to bear decisively on the 
ceteris paribus condition (just mentioned), for its satisfaction includes con-
firming such hypotheses as that there are no unacceptable side effects of the 
technological implementation, and no better means to produce the goods 
it is intended to produce. Hypotheses like these cannot be addressed exclu-
sively under materialist strategies; these are matters on which "science" (as 
understood in the predominant institutions of modern science) is largely 
silent, but where the opinions of scientists can forever pe defended by 
claiming that there is no "scientific" evidence against theril . This is clearly 
illustrated in the case of genetically engineered seeds: what are the side ef-
fects of their widespread use on the environment and social arrangements, 
and are they better than the agroecological alternatives (Lacey 2000; 2002c; 
2003a; 2003b; 2004b)? 
In the absence of research conducted under alternative strategies ( e.g., 
agroecological ones), positive assessments of hypotheses about side effects 
and alternative cannot be made in accordance with impartiality. Instead 
such assessments tend to reflect the value judgments linked with the adop-
tion of the strategy. This leaves untouched that the judgments made about 
the (potential) efficacy of the technology may have been made in accor-
dance with impartiality. Research conducted exclusively under materialist 
strategies can generate hypotheses about efficacy that are accepted in accor-
dance with impartiality, but generally not relevant hypotheses that are pre-
suppositions of legitimacy of application. That values may play an indis-
pensable role in the decision to adopt a strategy does not undermine that, 
in research conducted under the strategy, theories may be accepted in ac-
cordance with impartiality (cf. Proctor 1991). The lack of applied neutrality, 
which comes with this role of values, is consistent with impartiality. 
Three Moments of Scientific Activity; 
Possible Roles for Values at Them 
To put some clear order and generality into these remarks consider again 
the three moments that I introduced in section 1. On the model that I have 
been sketching, values have legitimate and often indispensable roles at M1 
and M3' but no indispensable role at M r At M3' no one disputes that an ap-
plication is made because it is intended to serve specific interests, and thus 
to further the manifestation of specific values, and that judgments of its le-
gitimation depend upon a multiplicity of value judgments. On my model, 
the key methodological decision made at M
1 
is about the adoption of a 
strategy; and a strategy may (but not always) be adopted-subject, in the 
long run, to research conducted under it being fruitful in generating theo-
ries that become accepted at M
2 
in accordance with impartiality-in view of 
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mutually reinforcing relations between adopting it and holding certain val-
ues, and the interest in furthering those values. Adopting a strategy defines 
the kinds of possibilities that may be identified in research (in important 
cases), possibilities that, if identified and actualized, would serve interests 
cultivated by the values linked with adopting the strategy. Adopting a strat-
egy per se does not imply that possibilities of these kinds exist and, if so, 
concretely what they are; such matters can only be settled at M
2 
where im-
partiality is the reigning aspiration. 
Theories that are accepted in accordance with impartiality at M
2
, given that 
they arise under a strategy, will offer understanding of domains of phe-
nomena and possibilities of limited scope, whose limits can often be clari-
fied by attention to the values implicated in adopting a strategy. Precisely 
because of this, applied neutrality cannot generally be counted on to hold 
(although there are plenty of well-known instances where a result, con-
firmed under materialist strategies, serves a great variety of interests). On 
application, at M3' theories will tend to serve especially well the values 
linked with the strategy under which they were developed and confirmed. 
Thus, the only way in which the activity of science, as a whole, can aspire to 
applied neutrality is to require that research be conducted under a multiplic-
ity of strategies. Then, provided that a sufficient variety is actually well de-
veloped, we could expect that there would be scientific knowledge available 
to inform projects valued from different value-outlooks. 
According to my model there is no objection, in principle, to the active 
development of a multiplicity of strategies, even where each particular strat-
egy has mutually reinforcing relations with a particular value-outlook. This 
achieves the "dedogmatization of science" that Santos (1989, 27) is striving 
for and shows that autonomy of methodology ( section 1.1) cannot be sus-
tained. Furthermore, a significant measure of applied neutrality can arise 
from methodological pluralism (Longino 1990; 2002), while it cannot 
from the methodological monism that ensures cognitive neutrality. More-
over, returning to the agricultural example, key presuppositions of the le-
gitimacy of the use of genetically modified seeds ( no adverse side effects, no 
better alternatives) can only be investigated empirically if multiple strate-
gies are in play (Lacey 2000; 2001; 2002c; 2003a; 2003b ). While I do not 
doubt that attempting to further the ideal of applied neutrality will generate 
difficulties and tension in scientific practice (Lacey 2004a, ch. 10), it is in-
tegral to the alternative way of structuring science that my model underlies. 
It permits us, in relevant fields, to develop multiple strategies with a clear 
awareness of the way in which a strategy may have links with particular val-
ues-so that, in the first place, the values will not play an unrecognized role 
in the acceptance and rejection of theories; secondly, controversies about 
values may become part of the discussions of the worldwide community of 
scientists, and scientists will have the freedom to opt for approaches that 
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will enable them to identify possibilities that may serve interests like those 
of the movements of the World Social Forum; and thirdly, science will not 
be not excluded from the domain of democratic discussion. 
Comment on the Controversy about A Discourse on the Sciences 
Santos (1992, 13) speaks of "a global model of scientific rationality, with 
some internal variation." I think that commitment to materialist strategies 
best defines this model since, I have claimed, normally in the institutions 
of modem science, science, qua rational activity, is said to be characterized 
by the features that I attribute to research conducted under materialist 
strategies. In these institutions knowledge gained in accordance with this 
model normally excludes other forms of knowledge from serious consider-
ation and considers them to be "less than scientific." This captures much of 
what Santos says about the "global model." At times, however, he appears 
to identify the model with the forms of materialist strategies present in 
mechanistic conceptions or in classical mechanics, for he considers that the 
transition from them to the strategies deployed in relativity theory and 
quantum mechanics begins to break with the "global model" (Santos 1992, 
22). In contrast, I interpret these as transitions to more sophisticated ver-
sions of materialist strategies, resourceful developments and strengthening 
of the model that are rationalized by empirical and other cognitive factors, 
without any special input from values and without bringing into theories, 
generated under them, categories (like mental or holistic ones) that have no 
place within materialist strategies (see also Freire 2005). The relationship 
that I have identified between adopting materialist strategies and and hold-
ing the specifically modem values about control remains constant across 
such transitions. 
Santos foresees and wishes to hasten the transition from this "global 
model" to an "emerging paradigm" -I prefer to anticipate a "new way of 
structuring of scientific activity" (see section 3 below)-one (as expressed 
insightfully in this book's subtitle) aiming to generate "prudent knowledges 
for a decent life." He appears, as I interpret his text within my framework, 
to discern two necessary, interconnected components in this transition: ( 1) 
the gradual internal dissolution of materialist strategies, which he thinks is 
already well under way, and (2) the recognition of a multiplicity of forms 
of knowledge and its acquisition, which are reflective of cultural diversity 
and the needs and interests of emancipatory movements. 
1 do not expect that ( 1) will happen; I do not desire it in the physical sci-
ences, and I am not swayed by the arguments Santos proposes for it. Where 
he sees the "global model" as in internally generated decline, I, especially 
when I reflect on the character of the strategies that frame relativity theory 
and quantum mechanics and the enormous growth of the cognitiv~ and 
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brain sciences, see its strength and its expansionary tendencies left 
unchecked. Proposing ( 1) has been interpreted as rhetorical and obscuran-
tist (Baptista 2002); and Santos' own label for his desired form of science, 
"postmodern," appears to add an element of credence to making the same 
charge against (2), for so-called postmodernist criticisms of science have of-
ten defended ( or been caricatured as defending) the view that scientific the-
ories are only open to sociological explanation and not to cognitive ap-
praisal. This is irrelevant, however, in the present context. Those 
"postmodernist" criticisms of science are not made by people close to 
emancipatory practices, as is Santos. Emancipatory practices cannot afford 
the luxury of drawing upon forms of understanding that do not meet the 
most rigorous cognitive standards. (As indicated at the outset, all defensible 
forms of appraisal of scientific theories, including that of a theory's poten-
tial relevance on application to emancipatory interests, presuppose their 
positive cognitive appraisal.) 
The important point is that the intelligibility of (2) and movement to-
wards it are quite independent of (1 )-and, in other works of Santos (1989; 
1999), (2)'s supposed link with (1) is not so prominent ( even if not totally 
abandoned). In my opinion, research conducted under materialist strate-
gies (preserving its own internal integrity) should remain important, within 
the kind of restructuring of scientific activity that I will attempt to articulate, 
as one approach to gaining scientific knowledge among others. What de-
gree of prominence it has should be a matter for ongoing negotiation 
within strong democratic institutions. This, I believe, coheres with the main 
lines of Santos' argument. 
A NEW WAY OF STRUCTURING SCIENTIFIC ACTIVI1Y 
To pose the question, "How should science be pursued in order to enhance 
human well-being?" or to pose Rousseau's question, does not show misun-
derstanding of the nature of science or threaten its integrity. Quite the con-
trary! Not to pose it is to leave unquestioned the ongoing practice of sci-
ence, which is predominantly shaped by mutually reinforcing relationships 
with the specifically modern values about the control of natural objects and 
the values ( connected with capital and the military) that, in turn, reinforce 
them. 12 This does not fit with the ideals of scientific practice. 
In view of the model of scientific activity presented in section 2, we can 
now restate the question: For the sake of enhancing human well-being, 
what range of strategies needs to be pursued in scientific research ?13 (We 
might add: Who should be the participants in the research at each of the key 
moments of decision making, and what kinds of scientific institutions are 
needed to pursue it effectively?) Conducting science in response to these 
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questions would point to a new way of structuring scientific activity. I will 
conclude this chapter by introducing four theses that point to features of 
this new way. (I do not pretend that I have presented conclusive arguments 
here, only indicators that need much more extensive development.) I offer 
these theses as suggestions made in the spirit of those proposed in the final 
section of Santos (1992): "All natural-scientific knowledge is social-scien-
tific" (Santos 1989, 31 ); "All knowledge is local and total" (Santos 1992, 
37); "All knowledge is self-knowledge" (Santos 1992, 40); "All scientific 
knowledge aims at becoming common sense"(Santos 1992, 43). I leave it 
for the reader to determine if my theses qualify, clarify, develop or contest 
those of A Discourse on the Sciences. 
Reciprocity of the Natural and Social Sciences 
Answering the question, "For the sake of enhancing human well-being, 
what range of strategies needs to be pursued in scientific research?" re-
quires, not an a priori response, but the conduct of systematic empirical in-
vestigation that is, in part, social scientific. That is because a fundamental 
dimension of human well-being is the exercise of cultivated, effective 
agency. Such agency is exercised when one acts in the important aspects of 
one's life, informed by one's beliefs, so that desires that are expressions of a 
broad array of the values one holds are regularly satisfied (Lacey 20026 ). 
Thus, answering the question requires understanding the range of values 
(personal, moral, social) that people aspire to manifest in their lives, their 
variation with culture, class and other factors, and what projects people 
have developed ( and aspire to develop) in order to further the exercise of 
their agency. 14 We cannot discover what range of strategies need to be pur-
sued in scientific research for the sake of enhancing human well-being ( or 
of gaining "prudent knowledge for a decent life"), unless we conduct this 
kind of social inquiry. 
Institutions of the restructured science will need to deal with the complex 
reciprocal interplay between the natural and social sciences ( d. Santos 
1989, 69ff). Only in the course of inquiry in the social sciences can we dis-
cover what is the range of value-outlooks that frame conceptions of well-be-
ing that are espoused throughout the world. This inquiry will help to iden-
tify the limits of neutrality of research conducted under materialist strategies, 
and any other strategy that may be developed. It will also identify value-out-
looks that may be interested in possibilities ( e.g., those of emancipation 
from dominant social structures), the exploration of which requires alter-
native strategies. Once the range of these value-outlooks has been identi-
fied, we can explore the set of strategies that may be desirable, in response 
to my question, for directing research in current social circumstances. The 
conduct of research, however, requires extensive and often expensive mate-
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rial and social conditions, so that it may not be possible to conduct research 
to the desirable extent under all of the strategies. It follows that under which 
of these strategies research actually will take place, and how priorities are set 
among them, should be a matter for democratic deliberation and enact-
ment (Santos 1989, 86). 15 (It is a major question for emancipatory politics 
to address the issue of how such democratic decision-making could happen 
in a reliable and effective way.) At the same time developments and appli-
cations of the natural sciences intervene in the social order, opening new 
possibilities for human life, reorderings of priorities and, sometimes, re-
vised value-outlooks, thus setting new tasks for the social sciences. 
Thesis 1. There is a profound unity between the natural and the social sciences 
based on their reciprocity. 
There are also other dimensions to the interplay of the two kinds of sci-
ences (Lacey 1990). Where the values about control and thus the interpre-
tation of section 1 are uncontested, it is common to develop social sciences 
and especially psychology (Lacey 2003c) under versions of materialist 
strategies, so that the kind of categories (pertaining to the formulation of 
laws, etc.) that are proper to the natural sciences developed under these 
strategies penetrate into the social sciences-with the legitimation that this 
is how to make these sciences "scientific." I have indicated (note 13) that I 
think that materialist strategies will retain an important place in the re-
structured science, with research conducted under it properly maintaining 
relative autonomy, without the penetration of categories from the human 
sciences. 16 But it is part of the distinctness of materialist strategies that, in 
the research conducted under them, phenomena and the possibilities they 
permit are dissociated from links with lived experience, value and social 
place. There is no reason, as I pointed out using the examples of "seeds," to 
hold that all the possibilities of phenomena can be identified when such 
dissociations are made. Moreover the same possibility identified with a de-
scription deploying the dissociated categories of materialist strategies may 
be identical to a possibility characterized using social categories. For exam-
ple, seeds that are produced by the techniques of genetic engineering ( de-
scribable under materialist strategies) are simultaneously commodities; so 
that if we want to know the full range of consequences of using these seeds, 
we need to investigate their effects qua commodities ( social entities) as well 
as their effects qua biological entities (Lacey 2001; 2002c; 2003a). Strategies 
that are alternatives to materialist strategies, for example, agroecological 
ones, may be designed in order to avoid these kinds of dissociations and 
aim to identify possibilities of natural objects in relation to their ecological 
and social contexts. In such strategies the routine categories of the natural 
and social sciences will cut across each other in ways that make it impossible 
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to separate the natural (biological) and the social. In these cases, rather 
than reciprocity, we have thorough interpenetration. 
Additional Theses 
Thesis 2. Any item of scientific knowledge is produced and confirmed under a 
particular strategy, which may be adopted because of its mutually reinforcing 
relations with particular values; but, if it is soundly confirmed, consistency 
with it is universally (rationally) demanded. 
This follows directly from the model of scientific activity of section 2. 
All strategies have a "local" or "limited" compass; none can aspire to en-
capsulate all the possibilities of phenomena. Gaining comprehensive un-
derstanding of phenomena requires the cultivation of a multiplicity of 
strategies, where each one (in principle) is able to identify a particular 
class of possibilities, and where interest in which may derive from valu-
ing that some of those possibilities be realized in (technological) practice. 
A strategy may draw upon the categories of traditional, local knowledge 
of a culture, and then any knowledge gained under it will constitute a 
continuation of the tradition. A considerable amount of knowledge 
gained under agroecological strategies is of this kind (Altieri 1995.) Al-
ternatively, it may have mutually reinforcing relations with values ( e.g., 
the values about control) that are linked with forces with "global" reach; 
but global reach is not the same thing as universal assent. Whatever the 
case may be, items of knowledge are only gained when theories are ac-
cepted in accordance with impartiality. While it would be irrational to de-
liberately act in contradiction of knowledge confirmed in accordance 
with impartiality or to reject it, simply because it was investigated under a 
strategy linked with values that one does not endorse, nevertheless one is 
not obliged rationally to enter into practices that are informed by such 
knowledge. As we have seen, impartiality does not imply neutrality; posi-
tive judgments of the cognitive value of a proposition are consistent with 
negative judgments of actions informed by it. 
Thesis 3 . Scientific theories are produced and confirmed in the course of inten-
tional activity, and the limits of the knowledge expressed in a theory are de-
pendent on the goals of the agents engaged in that activity; so that a scientist's 
understanding of what these limits are is well served by his having sound self 
knowledge. 
Scientists, I have claimed, have often misidentified their activity, incor-
rectly identifying research conducted under materialist strategies with sci-
entific research per se. Self-knowledge-knowing well the goals of the activ-
ities in which one is engaged and why those goals have been adopted-is a 
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good antidote to the tendency to misidentify the "local" knowledge gained 
under materialist strategies with knowledge of universal social value. 
Thesis 4. Scientific activity should (and can) be for the sake of furthering hu-
man well -being; its products thus enter deeply into the lives of everyone, so it 
should be carried out constantly under democratic guidance and scrutiny. 
Concluding Remark 
A final observation: Santos describes his objective in A Discourse on the 
Sciences as attempting to discern, with the rich array of sociological and his-
torical methods that he commands, the contours of the emerging new way 
of structuring science (or, in his words, the "emerging paradigm"). My ap-
proach, developed in the philosophy of science, complements Santos' and 
it can be deepened by ongoing dialogue with his. I have argued, with basis 
in my model of scientific activity ( section 2 ), for the necessity of engaging 
in research under a multiplicity of strategies. My four theses have elaborated 
some of the implications of taking seriously the idea of multiple strategies. 
I believe that this idea is indispensable for restructuring scientific activities 
so that they become carried out for the sake of furthering human well-be-
ing ( cf. Santos 1989, 44). It is also indispensable for science to approach its 
long-affirmed ideal of applied neutrality ( as distinct from the neutrality, 
bounded by consensus on the specifically modem values about control of 
natural objects, that is endorsed by the interpretation of science laid out in 
section 1 ). The interests of genuine scientific neutrality and human emanci-
pation can live happily together and mutually support each other. 
NOTES 
1. Philip Kitcher has raised questions like these repeatedly, within a broadly lib-
eral perspective, over the past decade (especially in Kitcher 1997, 2001). Compare 
Kitcher's formulations with the more radical ones of Paul Feyerabend and Robert 
Proctor: "being related to each other in lawful ways, [the entities unearthed by sci-
ence] can be manipulated or predicted by using these laws. There can be new com-
binations of them and new entities may in this way arise at the phenomenological 
level. But these entities are important only if the resulting world is pleasant to live 
in, and if the gains of manipulation more than compensate for the losses entailed 
by the losses of unscientific layers. The objection that the entities and laws that con-
nect them are 'real' and that we must adapt to them, no matter how dismal the con-
sequences, has no weight" (Feyerabend 1999, 12). "What we need is a political phi-
losophy of science, a philosophy that focuses on the forms of power in and around 
the sciences. The question for the political philosopher of science is [:] ... Who ben-
efits from knowledge ( or ignorance!) of a certain sort, and who suffers? How might 
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the practice of science be different? . . . We must also ask political, ethical, and activist 
questions: Why do we know what we know and why don't we know what we don't 
know? What should we know and what shouldn't we know? How might we know 
differently? (Proctor 1991, 13) 
Compare these remarks with others made by Feyerabend (1993) on criticizing sci-
ence in the light of "humanitarian" and "democratic" considerations and his re-
peated suggestions (Feyerabend 1993, 1999) that following a single approach to sci-
ence threatens human well-being (Lacey 2001 ) . Feminist philosophers of science 
( e.g., Anderson 1995; Longino 1990, 2002) have proposed yet further variations of 
questions like these. 
2. Throughout the chapter by "values" I mean "moral and social values;" simi-
larly "value judgment." There is a basically uncontroversial role for cognitive values 
at the core of science (Lacey 2004, ch. 3 ), but it is not be discussed here. The claim, 
which is crucial for my arguments, that cognitive values ( or the criteria for apprais-
ing the cognitive value of theories) are distinct from moral and social values, has 
been disputed. For my response, see Lacey (2004a, ch. 9; 2004b ). 
3. Autonomy should be qualified by: "provided that the research practices do not 
involve morally unacceptable actions or outcomes." Sometimes, then, in certain 
domains empirical data needed for making theoretical appraisals should not be 
obtained. Sometimes the value of gaining knowledge is subordinate to other moral 
values. This does not imply that moral values may function among the criteria of 
theory appraisal, but only that sometimes we may limit the quest for knowledge 
on moral grounds. My formulation allows that, at any given time, where the gen-
eral characteristics of a line of research are settled, cognitive interests leave open a 
range of problems that are (we might say) 'cognitively equally worthy' of further 
investigation. Then which of these problems is chosen ( e.g., to study one virus 
rather than another) as a research priority may reflect values. Autonomy implies 
that, qua scientific problem, the one chosen has no special primacy, so that scien-
tific institutions should not (as a whole) be dominated by an agenda defined by 
these values. As described, autonomy is compatible with values playing an impor-
tant part in the choices of research projects of individual scientists ( and particular 
scientific institutions). Arguments for science is value free usually draw upon prem-
ises such as: there is a sharp separation between fact and value; values express sub-
jective preferences, etc. Then, while it may be a fact that individual scientific 
choices reflect values, the subjectivity of values is taken to make it likely that 
choices representing a diversity of values will be made among the community of 
scientists, thus ensuring that particular values do not come to dominate the re-
search agenda. 
4. For extensive analysis and criticism of science is value free, and its component 
notions, see Lacey (2002a; 2004a). 
5. For the full details and the arguments, see especially Lacey (2004a). Most of 
the next section is taken from Lacey (2002b) and draws upon Lacey (2004b ) . 
6. I have stated the objective (albeit contentiously) so as to encompass all in-
quiries that are called "sciences" (including social sciences) and those that bear close 
affinities with them (see Lacey 1991, ch. 5). I include under "science" all forms of 
systematic empirical inquiry, because I do not want to rule out by definitional fiat, or 
to assume a priori, that forms of knowledge that are in continuity with traditional 
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forms of knowledge have comparable epistemic (cognitive) status to those of mod-
ern science. Also, I want a notion of "science" that is sufficiently inclusive that, in 
principle, no proposition about the world need be held to be excluded from the 
realm of scientific inquiry. (That does not mean that scientific inquiry will, in fact, 
be able to address them all.) In accordance with this usage of "science," any rea-
sonably systematic structure that expresses understanding of some domain of phe-
nomena counts as a theory. (Often it is preferred to limit "theory" to that which has 
mathematico-deductive structure or that which contains representations of laws, 
and not merely richly descriptive or narrative structure.) The effect of deploying this 
wider notion of "science," which-as we will see-underlies the new way of struc-
turing scientific activity (that permits a multiplicity of research strategies) that I pro-
pose, is to strengthen the empirical credentials that may be provided for claims 
made under the authority of science. 
7. For the relationship between "strategy" and Thomas Kuhn's notion of "para-
digm," see Lacey (2004a, 261). "Strategy" is closely connected with what Ian Hack-
ing calls "form of knowledge" (Hacking 1999). 
8. The success of research conducted under agroecological strategies (Altieri 
1995; references in Lacey 2002c) shows that accord witl1 impartiality can be reached 
under strategies that are not reducible to materialist ones (Lacey 2001; 2003b ). 
9. In Lacey (2004a, ch. 5) I consider and reject other arguments for the virtually 
exclusive adoption of materialist strategies, including arguments based upon mate-
rialist metaphysics and Kuhn's philosophy of science. Note that for Santos (1992, 
18) "modern science [as a) hegemonic model of rationality" is linked with "its ca-
pacity to control and transform [the real)." 
10. In Lacey (2002a) I fill out this summary statement by explicitly offering a list 
of the values, and exploring the presuppositions of rationally holding them. 
11. I describe the multiple dimensions of this mutually reinforcing relationship 
in Lacey (2002a; 2004a, 117-26). I do not claim that all research under materialist 
strategies is conducted for the sake of furthering the values about control. Deploying 
them exclusively for exploring many phenomena (e.g., celestial, subatomic) is un-
objectionable and is not rationalized by reference to the values. (Even so, given the 
dependence of research in these areas on "high" technological developments, links 
with the values about control are not absent.) Moreover (see section 2.5) the fur-
therance of the values about control was not a causal factor ( although it was a con-
sequence) in the transition from the strategies of classical mechanics to those of rel-
ativity and quantum mechanics. 
12. To question the values about control, as members of the World Social Forum 
do, does not mean that no value is attributed to control of natural objects, but only 
that the value of control is subordinated to or balanced with other social values 
(e.g., community empowerment, cultural integrity, preservation of biodiversity) . Cf. 
the following remark, referring to Santos' desire to "destroy the hegemony of mod-
ern science without undercutting the expectations that it generates ... The new con-
figuration of knowledge is, thus, the guarantee of the desire and the desire of the 
guarantee that technological development would contribute to the deepening of 
cognitive and communicative competence, and so it becomes transformed into 
practical knowledge and helps us to provide sense and authenticity to our existence" 
(Santos 1989, 46; my translation) . 
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13. I believe that materialist strategies will always be in the range, even that it may 
properly be granted a special place (Lacey 2001; 2004a, ch. 10). One reason for this 
is that strategies like agroecological ones utilize results of research conducted under 
materialist strategies in numerous indispensable ways. Such strategies should not be 
seen as complete alternatives to materialist strategies, but more as an interlocking set 
of local approaches each of which draws upon the results gained under materialist 
strategies, where convenient. Each one also qualifies claims that are put forward 
when materialist strategies are granted exclusivity. I do not know what eventual an-
swers to my restated question might be like. I have explored it in detail only in con-
nection with agricultural science. There I have argued that a multiplicity of strategies 
(including agroecological ones) is essential (Lacey 2000; 2002c; 2003a; 2003b). I am 
confident that this is so in other domains too. But, it might turn out to be the case 
that in some fields, for example, subatomic physics, research under materialist strate-
gies suffices; certainly, regarding this field, I have no alternative speculations to offer. 
14. In note 10, I referred to the presuppositions of rationally holding the mod-
ern values about control. I have argued that all value-outlooks have presuppositions 
of a broadly factual character (Lacey 2004a, ch. 2). The social science inquiry, which 
I am referring to here, should also appraise the evidence that supports such presup-
positions, including those of the value-outlooks of emancipatory movements. Not 
all value-outlooks that are articulated by people are worthy of serious recognition; 
those that rest upon clearly false presuppositions certainly are not. 
15. Certainly there is nothing about the expertise cultivated by professional sci-
entific practitioners under any strategy that especially prepares them for making 
these choices. 
16. Democratic decision-making applies to priorities and allocation ofresources 
at M1 and it is obviously relevant in all sorts of ways at M3, but it does not apply at 
the moment of accepting theories. Maintaining impartiality at M2 is of utmost im-
portance, regardless of the strategy under which the theories have been developed. 
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